

Well-Being as an Object of Moral Concern
Dai Zhen on Ethics and Well-Being

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February 10, 2020

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Dai Zhen as a Moral Philosopher (Introduction)

- I. The life of Dai Zhen
- II. Dai Zhen's place in Confucian philosophy
- III. Evidential studies (*Kaozheng xue* 考證學)
- IV. Dai's critiques of Confucian orthodoxy and popular morality
- V. Dai's positive account of ethical cultivation
- VI. Welfare and moral epistemology

Chapter Two: Shared Ends and Relationships of Mutual Fulfillment

- I. Dai on the creeping displacement of welfare from ethics
- II. The altruism criterion
- III. The wholeheartedness criterion
- IV. Empathy's role in ethical justification
- V. Self-mediated vs. other-mediated end-setting
- VI. Shared ends and mutual fulfillment
- VII. Dai Zhen on mixed motives

Chapter Three: Non-Welfarist Virtues: Theoretical Problems

- I. A challenge for virtue theories
- II. Why Dai isn't a welfarist
- III. Non-welfarist virtues
- IV. The central good: orderly life-fulfillment
- V. Systems of virtues
- VI. Well-being and moral considerability

Chapter Four: Virtue and Self-Interest

- I. Self-interested in what sense? Substantive vs. procedural accounts of self-interest (*si* 私)
- II. Advantages of Dai's more procedural account
- III. The Pity for the Powerless Argument
- IV. The Damming the Desires Argument
- V. The Argument from Mutual Fulfillment
- VI. Objections and replies

Chapter Five: The Relationship between Natural Tendencies and Ethical Imperatives

- I. Zhu Xi's view: two natures

- II. Criticisms of the two natures solution
- III. The appeal to Heaven (*Tian* 天)
- IV. Inherent nature and natural kinds
- V. The “two foundations” (*er ben* 二本) problem
- VI. Dai’s solution: “sage” (*sheng* 聖) as an attributive adjective
- VII. Objections and replies

Chapter Six: Dai Zhen’s fallibilism: moral epistemology for non-ideal agents

(Chapter in progress. To be presented at Columbia University in May, 2020)

Conclusion